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 Introduction 
Fragmentation of International human rights law is not a new phenomenon. It has been observed in various 
forms over a decade.  Fragmentation is also the subject for debate between academics and practitioners. 
Some of them see fragmentation as a positive phenomenon, while some consider that fragmentation is a 
threat for unity of international human rights law. One of the recent examples of fragmentation between 
Universal and Regional human rights systems is the issue of non-consensual placement and involuntary 
treatment of persons with psychosocial disability.  
 
Taking into account that out of forty seven Coe member states forty-six states are States Parties of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with disabilities. Adoption of the treaty, which sets a different standard, 
can hinder the effort UNCRPD and negatively influence States’ compliance with their obligations. Moreover, 
different approach between CRPD and the European Convention towards the subject creates even more 
risk. Thesis attempts to see how the existing fragmentation can be resolved. 
 
For these purposes the thesis consist of four main chapters. The first chapter looks at the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international human rights law and how it relates with the wider phenomenon such as 
fragmentation of international law. How it is understood by scholars and what are positive and negative 
aspects of fragmentation. 
 
Second chapter shifts focus to concrete example of fragmentation and the possible conflict of norms 
between the UNCROD and Draft protocol of Oviedo Convention. Moreover, it examines the jurisprudence of 
European Court of Human Rights, and leads to the conclusion that the fragmentation is also observed 
between the approaches of ECtHR and CRPD 
 
The following chapter will discuss how the conflict of norms can be overcome what is the role of domestic 
legislations of the member states. It will argue that if harmonisation between states with CRPD standard is 
achieved on large scale it will lead to the emergence of European consensus and will change the approach 
of the Court which will lead to the harmonisation of the standard between CRPD and the Coe. 
 
The importance of NHRI and SC organisations in achieving the coherence of domestic legislation with 
UNCRPD standard will be analysed in last chapter. It will focus on importance of article 33 of UNCRPD 
which envisages the central role for National Human Rights Mechanisms (such as Ombudsman's, Public 
Defender's Offices) and to Civil Societies in promotion, protection and monitoring the implementation of the 
Convention by States. This article can be considered as a practical tool which can effectively influence the 
States and achieve the harmonisation and compliance of national legislation with the Convention. 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Understanding Fragmentation of International Human Rights Law  
 
Fragmentation of international law, which lies in the process of globalization1 is understood as breaking up of 
system of international law and formation of so-called self-contained regimes2. Hence, fragmentation of 
international human rights law is closely associated with the fragmentation of international law. One of the 
most comprehensive documents addressing the issue is the Report of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) which studied this phenomenon.3 According to the ILC, the main reason of fragmentation is “functional 
differentiation” of international law, the increasing specialization of its constitutive parts and their 
“autonomization.”4 Together with proliferation of rules, regimes and institutions of international law,5 
inexistence of world legislator, and the parallel and diverse law-making process, increasing number of 
regulated subjects-matters, increases the likelihood of the creation of conflicting norms6 and could damage 
the coherence of international law.7    
Fragmentation is the subject of academic debate over the decade.8 The amount of literature is enormous. 
Various commentators have been investigating what is the fragmentation, what are its consequences, 
whether it should be considered as a positive or negative phenomenon and “how much fragmentation of 
international law can accommodate before serious tensions or even conflict of rules occur between different 
fields of law and regions of the world.”9 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?, 
40 International Law and Politics, 259, 261, 262 (2007).  
2For discussion of what is understood by the concept of self-contained regimes, see Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law, International Law Commission, Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.628 (2002),  p.86. 
3 UN General Assembly, International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification 
And Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law COmmission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ 
(2006). 
4 Commission (n 1).para 11 
5 Wilfried Jenks, Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 British Yearbook of International Law,  401, 405 (1953) 
6 Marco Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law Wither Human Rights?’ (2009) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
law.p.68 
7 Ian Brownlie, Problems concerning the unity of international law”, in 1 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL A L’HEURE DE SA 
CODIFICATION: EDUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE ROPERTO AGO, (A.Giuffre ed.,) (1987) p. 156. 
8 Adamantia Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: Insights, Good Practices and Lessons to Be Learned from the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Leiden Journal of International Law’ [2015] Leiden Journal of International Law. 
9 Svetlana Tyulkina, ‘Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law: Political Parties and Freedom of Association in the Practice of 
the UN Human Rights Committee, European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights.’ (2014) 32 Nordic 
Journal of Human Rights p.158  
a. Fragmentation as a phenomenon  
As Marjan Ajevski is referring in her work, “the attempt of defining fragmentation is fraught with peril.”10 It is a 
complex phenomenon closely connected to the proliferation of international law in general.  
As explained in the academic works, the fragmentation of international law is observed when “similar or even 
identical norms attain different meanings and interpretations, in light of the structure, aim, and specificities of 
a given treaty.”11 Moreover, emergence of more law-making international treaties can lead to the situation 
when the identical matter is regulated in a different, sometimes in a conflicting way.12  
The system of human rights has a complex architecture, consisting of multiple regimes and layers with 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. These multifaceted mechanisms develop concurrent 
standards.13 These regimes are coexisting in parallel and as a rule, a State can be a member of several 
human rights regimes. As for instance an European State would be a member of both the UN and the 
Council of Europe and accordingly be a party to international treaties and conventions under both regimes 
and have obligations towards both institutions. Moreover, in human rights as in international law more and 
more specialized fields are emerging. 14  The same rights are regulated and defined by multiple treaties, 
monitored and interpreted by multiple bodies. This leads to fragmentation and the conflicts between the 
interpretation of norms by specialized treaty bodies or adjudicative bodies.15 This potentially could create 
challenges within the functional sub-system,16 creating space for different interpretations of the standard 
especially in situations when these treaties have the same States parties.17  
b. Views on fragmentation: is it positive or negative phenomenon and examples of fragmentation 
Fragmentation of international law and international human rights law in particular lead to the different 
position and assessment from international lawyers. Some authors have been very critical towards the 
phenomenon, associating it with the risk of “erosion of general international law, emergence of conflicting 
jurisprudence, forum shopping and loss of legal security. While others, consider fragmentation as a technical 
problem, which can be resolved with more coordination.18  
                                                 
10 Marjan Ajevski, ‘Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law – Beyond Conflict of Laws’ (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 87  
11 Rachovitsa (n 4). p 873 
12 Lorna McGregor, The Relationship of the UN Treaty Bodies and Regional Systems In Routledge Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law (Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley ed, Taylor & Francis Group 2013).P 511 
13 Eva Brems, ‘We Need to Look at International Human RIghts Law (Also) as a Whole’ (EJIL:Talk!). Available at: : 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/we-need-to-look-at-international-human-rights-law-also-as-a-whole/ 
14 Lucas Lixinski, ‘Choice of Forum in International HUman RIghts. Adjudication and the Unity/Fragmentation Debate: Is Plurality the 
Way Ahead’ (2009) 23 ( U C Dublin L Rev. p.28 
15 Anne (n 15).p.676 
16 Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?:  Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International 
Law ” available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2933&context=faculty_scholarship p. 19. 
17 Bruno Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ (2009) 20. no.2 The European Journal of 
International Law. 
18 ILC Report at page 12 
The main argument considering the fragmentation as a negative phenomenon is that it “threatens the unity” 
of human rights.19 Taking into account the inexistence of hierarchy in international law and absence of “world 
legislator” one part of authors fear that there is nothing to stop a normative conflict. 20 In contrast, many 
scholars believe that fragmentation has a positive effect on general international law. Peters, points out that it 
is “adequate reaction to modernity and modern complexity of life”21 and its benefit is stimulation of 
competition between different organisations and regimes. This is of particular importance as it leads to the 
creativity of these regimes and allows “exploration and experimentation, (…) allows for correcting mistakes, 
reduces the risk of failure of one single institution, and thus overall leads to improved performance, notably to 
better law-making and law-application”22  Moreover, as cited by McGregor, Jonathan Charney, considers 
fragmentation as a healthy process.23 The fact that the tribunals differ in their approaches, towards the same 
issue, the different views elaborated by them, stimulates the debates over the decisions which “help the 
international community discover what may be the most acceptable interpretations of international law.”24   
In contrast with the fragmentation of general international law in human rights law some commentators, state 
that the fragmentation is more connected to the question of conflict of jurisdiction and to the fact that different 
monitoring/treaty bodies can take different or incompatible decisions or establish such practices.25 They 
argue that fragmentation in this self-contained regime is not caused by the existence of different substantive 
provisions, rather with the “colliding institutional preferences and structural biases of the different human 
rights treaties,”26 which can lead to different interpretations of the specific human rights standards.27 and 
variation on “what right means.”28 As noted by Payandeh, tensions related to interaction among them or 
issues connected to forum shopping or conflicting jurisdictions can be easily mitigated by procedural 
safeguards.  
The question of the threat of unity of international human rights law and the role of fragmentation is often 
seen from the lens of debate on “Universalism/Relativism.”29 Lixinski observes that in the context of IHRL, 
uniformity should be seen as a tool for prioritization “western hegemonic interpretations” of the specific right 
is not desirable.30 Moreover, Lorna McGregor considers fragmentation as inevitable due to the extensive 
number of human rights regimes and “commonalities in the rights provided in their governing treaties.”31 
Tylkina, agrees with this. Moreover, when assessing the fragmentation of approaches regarding the question 
                                                 
19 Rachovitsa, Adamtina 
20 Ajevski (n 6). P. 87 
21 Anne Peters(n 15).680 
22 ibid.681 
23 J. Charney, ‘The “Horizontal” Growth of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges and Opportunities?’ (2002) 96 ASIL Annual 
Meeting Proceedings 369 at 370; cited in Lorna McGregor (n 21). P. 515 
24 ibid. 
25 Mehrdad Payandeh (n 9).p.299 
26 ibid 
27 ibid. 
28 Erik Voeten, ‘Competition and Complementarity between Global and Regional Human Rights Institutions’ (2017) 8 Global Policy 120. 
29 Lixinski (n 17).p.30 
30 ibid.p 112 
31 Lorna McGregor (n 21).517 
of the freedom of association specific to political parties as a challenge to the universality of the standard, 
states that it represents the phenomenon which should not be considered as a negative.32 Fragmentation is 
closely linked to the relativism of human rights. Due to different factors such as political, historical social, 
cultural and legal circumstances the regional systems of human rights vary from each other. These are the 
factors which are influencing the formation of the standard and differences can be accommodated through 
fragmentation. It “allow each system to preserve its autonomy and uniqueness, and to adjust to local 
conditions in which these instructions function.”33  
In contrast Berry, who partially agrees with Lixinski that uniformity might undermine the pluralism in 
international human rights law and give the preference to the interpretations given by more general human 
rights bodies, over the specialized bodies, still sees the risk in fragmentation.34 In particular, he states that 
there is a risk that the “conflicting interpretation…can undermine the legitimacy of a regime and lead to non-
compliance with the most onerous interpretation of standards.35 In his study  
Another problem identified by scholars is the loss of legal certainty. When assessing the fragmentation in the 
practice of human rights adjudicative bodies, Follesdal highlights that different interpretations and decisions 
can damage the “stabilization of expectations”.36 He notes that the resolution of disputes is not the only 
function of the adjudicative bodies, rather than creation of predictability about the requirements of the certain 
law for States.37  
When talking about fragmentation it should be also taken into account that very often states are parties to 
several international human rights treaties which include and provide for the same human rights. The 
different interpretation of the rights might affect the national implementation and formation of the standard. 
Worst scenario in this case would be the existence of the conflicting norms which would lead a State to 
violate one for the compliance with another. This hypothetical situation is further complicated by the fact that 
nearly all treaties have their own monitoring bodies, which are looking at the State compliance with the 
specific treaty provisions and are authorised by States to consider individual complaints against them. 38 
Thus, on the domestic level, the principle of legal certainty is particularly significant, as it is in direct 
correlation with States’ actions directed at interpreting and implementing human rights in their municipal 
settings to be enjoyed and used by individuals and entities.  
                                                 
32 Tyulkina (n 5).171 
33 ibid. 
34 Stephanie E Berry, ‘Democracy and the Preservation of Minority Identity: Fragmentation within the European Human Rights 
Framework’ (2017) 24 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 223. 
35 ibid. 
36 Andreas Follesdal (n 28).p.2 
37 ibid. 
38 Lorna McGregor (n 21).506 
Practical examples of challenges raised as a result of fragmentation of international human rights law and 
different interpretation of the same right by different human rights regimes, as well as within the same regime 
are evident. As already mentioned, Tylkina in her article,39 examined how three jurisdictions - the UN Human 
Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IAcHR) interpret the freedom of association of political parties.40 She found that although the 
fragmentation while interpreting the right was on face, there was no “substantive normative divergence or 
convergence” and the differences between the approaches of these institutions could be overcome with the 
institutional dialogue.41 
 
Apart from the fragmentation within the within the sub-regimes of international human rights law, this 
phenomena could also be observed within the same regional same human rights regional sub-system. 
Fragmentation between the international human rights and international minority regimes in the Council of 
Europe serves as an example. Although both, ECHR as well as the Framework on Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities were developed in the same system, their interpretation of the rights 
pertaining to the preservation of minority identity is very different.42 In both cases, respective treaty bodies, 
such as Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC-
FCNM) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpreted the substantively same norms in a 
conflicting way.43 Here, Berry sees the risk that such a practise will lead to undermining of the work 
undertaken by both bodies. As suggested by Tylkina, the effective way of conflict mediation can be 
establishing and enhancing a dialogue between treaty bodies.44  
 
Fragmentation in human rights law can be observed also when the different treaty bodies, practicing their 
quasi-judicial or judicial power arrive to different conclusions while examining the same or factually similar 
cases. Example of such fragmentation is the case of Layla Sahin,45 adjudicated by ECtHR and case of 
Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan46 heard by HRC. Both cases had a very similar factual circumstances 
and concerned the prohibition of wearing the headscarf in Universities. In one case ECtHR found no violation 
of the right to manifest the religion and the prohibition of equality and non-discrimination, when HRC in 
                                                 
39 Tyulkina (n 5). 
40 ibid.171; It should be noted that all three human Rights treaties, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) contain the special article on 
the Freedom of Association. 
41 ibid. 209 
42 Berry (n 51). 
43 ibid. 
44 Stephanie E Berry, ‘Democracy and the Preservation of Minority Identity: Fragmentation within the European Human Rights 
Framework’ (2017) 24 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 228. 
45 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey 
46 Hudoybergova v. Uzbekistan Human Rights Committee, 2004 
contrast in its opinion stated that the state violated the “right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.”47 
Academics have different opinions how the fragmentation can be tackled. Some of the see “judicial dialogue” 
as a solution,48. Some commentators consider that the answer is in public international law and Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 49 Though conclusion can be made that evolving nature of human rights 
law and its diversification leads to the fragmentation. Next chapter will look how the standard non-consensual 
placement and involuntary treatment is fragmented between United Nations and Council of Europe. 
 
Chapter 2   Involuntary Placement and Non-consensual Treatment of persons with psychosocial 
impairment in two systems; 
 
a. The historical overview of the involuntary placement   
            Over the years, persons with disabilities (PwDs) have been discriminated and excluded from participation in 
society. This fact is well recognised by scholarship and practitioners. Commentators and human rights 
experts have pinpointed several approaches and models to disability, which evolved with time. One of the 
earliest model has been so-called Moral and/or Religious model, which looks at the disability as an act of 
God,50 In contrast, Charity Model looks at persons with disabilities as victims of circumstances, who need the 
protection and care.51  Medical model that found its development from mid-1800 looks at a disability as a 
disease and “deviation from a normal health,”52 which should be “treated, fixed, cured and rehabilitated.”53 
 
           Persons with psychosocial disabilities have been even more stigmatized throughout history. Due to their 
certain psychosocial disabilities they have been perceived  as not having a capacity to make choices and 
decisions, including and especially about their mental health-care and treatment. They have been seen as 
“passive beneficiaries of charitable interventions”.54 This approach has been reflected in international law as 
well. Terms such as “persons with unsound mind,”55 “persons with mental disorder,”56 “mentally ill,”57 
“mentally retarded persons” used in different treaties and policy documents, serve as a good illustration. 
 
                                                 
47 ibid.517 
48 Anne Peters 696 
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1969 
50 R Retief M. and Letsosa, ‘Models of Disability: A Brief Overview’ (2018) 74(1) HTS Teologiese Studies. 
51 ibid. also Mary Ann Jackson, ‘Models of Disability and Human Rights: Informing the Improvement of Built Environment Accessibility 
for People with Disability at Neighborhood Scale?’ 7(1) Laws. 2018; 
52 Mary Ann Jackson,  
53 Mary Ann Jackson,  
54  Silvia Favalli 520 
55 Article 5 ECHR 
56 Oviedo Convention Article 7 
57 Draft Convention 
            Medical and Biomedical models of disability build on this presumption, developed paternalistic policies and 
laws, towards persons with psychosocial disabilities.58 As explained by Vikram, Faraaz and Ashley, 
Biomedical approach towards mental health encourages the view that in some cases “substitute decision – 
making” is necessary, i.e., “the judgment of a proxy superseding that of an individual, when that individual is 
deemed to be “incapacitated”.59 This model led to the introduction of guardianship laws60 delegating a right to 
make decisions to family members and/or legal guardians. This approach was widely accepted (and still is) 
in international  and domestic legal and policy documents regulating the medical treatment of persons with 
psychosocial disability and their placement in special medical facilities and institutions.61 As explained later 
by the Special Rapporteur, substitute decision makers,62 who as a rule are appointed by third parties, are 
making decisions based on “what they considered to be in the best interest” of  persons with psychosocial 
and cognitive disabilities63 and are not taking into account will and preferences of a person.  
 
            Before adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2006, at the 
international level the rights of PwDs were protected through general human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICSER). In Council of Europe (CoE) the rights of persons with disabilities are protected 
through the European Social Charter (ESC) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
various policy documents.64 Both regimes introduced different non-binding documents, including 1993 UN 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, 1982 World Programme of 
Action concerning Disability Persons, .1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, Council 
of Europe Disability Action Plan 2006-2015 etc65  
            As rightly pointed out by Lawrence, human rights protection of persons with psychosocial disabilities, 
including in cases of involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment has been mainly focused on three 
tenants. First, providing safeguards with “the right to fundamental fairness in compulsory admission and 
                                                 
58 Silvia Favalli, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and in the Council of Europe Disability Strategy 2017-2023: “From Zero to Hero”’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 
520. 
59 Patel Vikram Mahomed Faraaz, Stein Michael Ashley, ‘Involuntary Mental Health Treatment in the Era of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ [2018] PLos Med 2. 
60 Degener (n 6). 
61 ‘For Example the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, Adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December 1982, 
(Resolution 37/52) Highlights That “When people such as the severely mentally disabled may not be able to represent themselves 
adequately in decisions affecting their lives, family members or legally designated agents should take part in planning and decision-
making.”  UN Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, illustrates the biomedical approach towards the persons with 
Psychosocial disabilities. Out of 7 principles two principles – fifth and seventh were defining the right to “qualified guardian”# and the 
procedural guarantees of restriction their rights in certain cases.”   
 
62 As explained in the report forms of substitute-decision making are different forms of “guardianship, judicial interdiction, curatorship, 
conservatorship and mental health laws that allow involuntary treatment and commitment.” ibid. please also see: United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities General Comment 1: Article 
12 Equal Recognition before the Law’ (2014) 03120 1, para 15  
63 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Council, Human Rights Session, Thirty-seventh, 2018, 26 
February–23 March para 26. 
64 Favalli  517. 
65UN Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons  
subsequent detention in mental institutions.“66 This is scrutinised through the prism of the right to liberty and 
security67 of persons while requiring existence of guarantees of “adequate procedural and substantive 
safeguards established by law.”68 In instances when a person is not deinstitutionalized, articles guaranteeing 
the right to health are applied.69 Second area of protection is linked to the “neglectful or abusive conditions in 
mental hospitals and harmful or intrusive forms of medical treatment.”70 Identification of instances of such 
violation is mainly done through monitoring of existence of practices of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment in specialized institutions.71 Third direction is looking from the lance of prohibition of discrimination 
and how the rights such as privacy, marriage, freedom association are realized.72 
More specific regulations are given in the United Nations Principles for the Protection for Persons with 
Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (MI Principles).73 MI Principles do not have the 
binding power, they are soft law instrument, however, they represent an important tool for the interpretation 
of the obligations towards the persons with psychosocial disability. MI Principles although highlight the 
importance of consent for treatment or hospitalisation, are recognising the possibility of treatment and 
placement of persons in mental health facility when they lack legal capacity.74 In case of restriction of legal 
capacity on the ground of “mental illness” MI principles are setting the procedural guarantees such as fair 
trial, right to counsel and right of revision of the decision in “reasonable intervals.” for the process of 
appointment the personal representative.75 
In terms of involuntary admission of a person in mental health facility for non-consensual treatment, MI 
Principles set standards and procedures, excluding the necessity of consent for the “plan of treatment when 
held as an involuntary patient.”76 It looks at the following aspect: (a) the existence of “mental illness” 
determined by a qualified mental health practitioner; (b) whether there exists a serious likelihood of 
immediate or imminent harm to a person or to other persons and (c) person’s refusal on placement “will likely 
lead to a serious deterioration in his or her condition.”77  
                                                 
66 O Gostin Lawrence and Lance Gable, ‘The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application 
of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health’ (2004) 1 Maryland Law Review 63 25. 
67 Article 9 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of ECHR 
68 For example, General Comment No.35 on Article 9 (Liberty and Security) of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) para 19 
69 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is looking whether highest attainable standard 
of health is available for persons with psychosocial disability, moreover as explained in General Comment No14 on the Right to health, 
coercive medical treatments are allowed “on an exceptional basis for the treatment of mental illness” (para 34 
70 Lawrence and Gable (n 20). 25 
71 Except from General treaties, such  as ICCPR, ECHR, the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatments in specialized 
institutions is also monitored by specialized regimes such as UN Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment” and European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.  
72 Lawrence and Gable .25 
73 Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental health care Adopted by the General 
Assembly resolution 46/119, 17 December 1991. 
74 Principle 6 Ibid 
75 Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental health care (n 23) principle 1, para 6. 
76 ibid principle 11, para 6 (a). 
77 ibid Principle 16. 
Moreover MI Principles contain general limitation clause78 which sets restrictions for the safeguards 
enshrined in the document in situations when: (a) limitations are prescribed by law; (b) is necessary to 
protect  health or safety of a person concerned or others and (c) for protection public safety, order, health or 
morals or other fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
The standard of legal capacity and approach to involuntary treatment and/or placement was drastically 
changed after the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006 – the first 
human rights treaty of the 21st. Century.79 The Convention was the result of the struggle of the international 
disability rights movement,80 which became famous for its slogan “nothing about us without us.”81 The 
disability rights movement was even considered to be the last among “long series of liberation movements.”82 
With the involvement of more than 400 NGO and DPO representatives, the drafting process of the 
Convention was exceptional. 83 As highlighted by Degener, it was not only the fight of human rights lawyers, 
activists and DPOs but rather the “individual struggle of disabled people for recognition and respect.”84  
Another breakthrough achieved during the drafting process of the CRPD, was the negotiated social model of 
disability,85 which sees disability as a result of social construction. The model shifted the focus from 
individual to society and introduced the differences between impairment and disability. According to the 
social model, impairment is related to the “condition of the body or the mind” while the disability is a result of 
discrimination and social oppression, and how it constructs the environmental and social barriers around the 
persons with disabilities.86  
CRPD is complex treaty covering the wide range of rights. It represents the “paradigm shift” in disability 
policy.87 Some scholarship states that with its innovative concepts, CRPD went beyond the social model and 
introduced new, Human Rights model of disability.”88  
One of the most innovative and still debatable provisions of the CRDP is Article 12, which prescribes equal 
recognition before law. Inclusion of this right into the text of the document was one of requests from disability 
                                                 
78 MI principles Ibid 
79 Gauthier De Beco and Alexander Hoefmans, ‘National Structures for the Implementation and Monitoring of the UN Convention on The 
Rights of Persons With Disabilities’ in Gauthier De Beco (ed), Article 33 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, 
National Structures for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Convention. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 12. 
80 Degener (n 6) 8. 
81 Callus Anne-Marie, Camilleri-Zahra “Nothing About Us Without Us”: Disabled People Determining Their Human Rights Through The 
UNCRPD” Mediterranean Review of Human Rights vl 1 
82  Callus Anne-Marie, Camilleri-Zahra p3 
83 Oomen Barbara, ‘Fragmentation/Integration of Human Rights Law- a Users’ Perspective on the CRPD’ in Brems Eva and 
Ouald_Chaib Saila (ed), Fragmentation and Integration of Human Rights Law: Users Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing LImited 
2018).p.90 
84 Degener (n 6). 
85 Theresia Degener, ‘Disability in a Human Rights Context’ (2016) 5 Laws 35, 24. 
86 Retief M. and Letsosa . 
87 The Conventions approach to disability is considered as “paradigm Shift” by majority of authors such as Silvia Favalli, ‘The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights and in the 
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rights activists and the World Net-work of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP).”89 Article recognises 
that “persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”90 In 
combination with other articles enshrined in the CRPD, Article 12 has led to the absolute prohibition of 
involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment of persons with psychosocial impairments, which will 
be discussed in the next sub-chapter.  
 
b. Prohibition of Involuntary Placement and Non-consensual treatment – Standard of CRPD  
The CRPD is one of the most ratified treaties in history. As of today, it has 180 States Parties,91 out of forty-
seven Council of Europe member States forty-six has ratified the Convention, the only state which has not 
ratified it, is Liechtenstein.92 It is also the first UN treaty ratified by European Union (EU). The Convention 
contains a wide range of civil and political, as well as social economic and cultural rights.93 It has introduced 
several core principles such as “autonomy” non-discrimination, inclusion, respect for difference, equality of 
opportunity, accessibility, equality of men and women and respect for the evolving capacities of children with 
disabilities.94 As it was already mentioned, it was a drastic transition from the paternalistic disability approach 
to recognition of autonomy of persons with disabilities95 and as active citizens eligible fully participate in the 
life of society. 96  
The CRPD is the first international treaty which introduced absolute prohibiting of the involuntary placement 
and non-consensual treatment of persons with psychosocial impairments. The prohibition derives from two 
articles, article 12 (equal recognition before the law) and 14 (right to liberty and security). It is also closely 
related to Article 5 (equality and non-discrimination), Article 17 (the right to physical and mental integrity) and 
article 25 (right to health), which enshrines the principle of free and informed consent.  
Article 12 can be interpreted as the right to be not only recognized before the law, but also to be able to 
enjoy and exercise the rights. This includes the right persons with psychosocial impairments to make 
decisions about their medical treatment. Although existing regulations and practices are recognising the 
importance of informed and free consent for medical interventions, they include circumstances when consent 
of substitute decision-maker or existence of certain factors can justify treatment and placement of persons 
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with psychosocial impairment. The CRPD does not recognise such exceptions and states that any treatment 
based on the consent of substitute decision-makers should be considered as non-consensual.97 Moreover, 
whereby person may be detained on the grounds of their actual perceived impairment, […] if additional 
factors or criteria are also used to justify the deprivation of liberty, 98 such as “risk of dangerousness, alleged 
need of care or treatment or other reasons tied to impairment or health diagnosis.”99  
If such danger exists States should act according to “criminal or other laws in place to deal with those 
matters.”100 This position was reaffirmed by the Office of the High Commissioner who stated that “persons 
with disabilities may be lawfully deprived of their liberty (only) for committed a crime or violated the law.”101   
As clarified by the Committee the standard derives from Article 3 of the Convention which guarantees the 
“respect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy – including the freedom to make one’s own choices – 
and, independence of persons”;102  As highlighted by authors the approach of the Committee towards the 
equal recognition before the law is a statement that rights” are acquired via birth and are universal, i.e., every 
human being is a human rights subject.103 Although rights can be restricted, “they do not require a certain 
health status or a condition of functioning.“104  
Of course, the CRPD Committee recognises that in some cases persons with psychosocial impairments 
might face the difficulty to express their will. Thus, the article 12 requires States to introduce and provide 
supported decision-making options instead of supporting decision-making which should give “primacy to a 
person’s will and preferences.”105 
The importance of Article 12 was reaffirmed by UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, stating that due to the central role of article for realisation and enjoyment of other rights, all 
declarations and reservations made by the States Parties should be seen as incompatible with the object 
and purpose. The Rapporteur called states to act according to the article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT),106 and withdraw them. 107 
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The standard adopted by the CRPD, on the absolute legal capacity of disabled people (article 12) and its 
General Comment No.1 has been criticized for not having consultations with the “clinicians”108. As it was 
already mentioned it was one of the most argued and controversial standards which led to the reservations 
to this principle. In particular out all States parties of the Convention thirteen States made Declarations and 
reservations on Article 12, some of them together with articles 14 and 25. Amongst them seven are members 
of the Council of Europe.109  
The majority of States Parties according to Concluding Observations of the Committee are not in compliance 
with this standard.110 Moreover, controversy of standard can be also seen on the UN level where the 
fragmentation of the standard on prohibition of non-consensual treatment and involuntary placement of 
persons with psychosocial impairment can be observed within human rights treaty bodies. The recent study 
prepared under the Essex Autonomy Project is an evidence for this.111 As study illustrated, although several 
human rights treaty bodies, such as UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and UN Committee on the Rights of the Child tend to harmonise their position with CRPD 
standard,112 other treaty bodies, UN Committee against Torture (CAT)  the UN Subcommittee on Prevention 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT), Un Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and most importantly the UN Human rights Committee (CCPR) “allow” 
non-consensual treatment or, involuntary placement of persons with psychosocial impairments.113 The main 
inconsistency with the standards on non-consensual treatment and involuntary treatment of persons with 
psychosocial impairments occurs between the CRPD and the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR).114 It is 
worth noting that both general comments - the General Comment No.1 (CRPD)115 and General Comment no. 
35 on article 9 on Liberty and security of persons116 (CCPR) were adopted in 2014. The General Comment 
No.1 was adopted 9th of May, and the General Comment no.35, (which replaced the General Comment no. 
8 on the same article), was adopted on the 16th of December. This leads to the conclusion that CCPR when 
working on the document was aware of the position of the CRPD on absolute prohibition of involuntary 
placement. Although CCPR in its General Comment called upon the States Parties “to revise outdated laws 
and practices in the field of mental health in order to avoid arbitrary detention,”117 it referred to its case-law 
and clarified the exceptional circumstances when the deprivation of liberty can be justified if it is “necessary 
and proportionate, for the purpose of protecting the individual in question from serious harm or preventing 
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117 General Comment 35. para 19 
injury to others.”118 The Committee identified main criteria for considering the measures as lawful such as: a. 
least resort, b. shortest appropriate period of time, c. measures should be accompanied by adequate 
procedural and substantive safeguards established by law;119 Although the CRPD has widely influenced the 
human rights discourse on PWDs not only in UN level, but also at CoE level the approach of  latter is differs 
from the standard on non-consensual treatment and involuntary placement of persons with psychosocial 
impairments.    
 
c. CoE standard for involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment 
Unlike the UN, The CoE never adopted a special instrument for the protection of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. As previously mentioned, the rights of persons with psychosocial impairments are addressed 
through ECHR and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law, ESC, other specialized treaties120 
and the policy documents.121 Though the involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment is regulated 
by ECtHR and Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (hereinafter Oviedo).122 Standard enshrined in 
both treaties, conflicts with the CRPD requirements, which is not surprising due to the fact that both 
instruments were adopted before CRPD.    
The main reason of conflict is the approach to legal capacity of persons with psychosocial impairments. 
While CRPD, as already discussed, prohibits restriction of legal capacity, both treaties, ECHR and Oviedo 
Convention recognize the lawfulness of interference in the right when certain criteria are satisfied.  
In particular, ECtHR mainly looks at the involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment through Article 
5 (Right to liberty and security) and Article 8 (Right to private and family life). One of the main factors, which 
is assessed by ECtHR, in cases concerning the violations of Article 5, is the lawfulness.123 However, in cases 
concerning persons with psychosocial impairment, due to the fact that article 5 explicitly allows deprivation of 
liberty on the ground “unsound mind” approach is different.124 The Court grants a Margin of Appreciation to 
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states in deciding whether individual should be detained as a “person of unsound mind,” (…) since it is in the 
first place for the national authorities to evaluate the evidence adduced before the in a particular case.”125  
 
When considering whether the deprivation of liberty of persons with psychosocial impairment was “lawful” the 
ECtHR looks at the following criteria:126  
 
a. Individual must be reliably shown to be of “unsound mind” by objective medical expertise otherwise the 
ECtHR will find the violation.127 
b. “Mental disorder” must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; - in such cases the 
ECtHR recognises that the involuntary placement of persons with psychosocial impairments is possible when 
a person “needs control or supervision to prevent him, for example, causing harm to himself and others.”128 
c. The validity of continued confinement must be conditional upon the persistence of such a disorder - when 
applying this test ECtHR looks whether the compulsory treatment was necessary.129  
 
For satisfying the test of “lawfulness” in case of “involuntary hospitalisation,” person with psychosocial 
impairment should have right of seeking judicial review130 and assistance of council during the court 
proceedings.131  
 
Due to the fact, that mental health by the ECtHR is considered to be part of the private life,132  refusal to 
medical treatment falls under the protection of Article 8. 133 The right to private and family life is the qualified 
right, which contains the limitation clauses and if satisfied allows interference.  In particular, the interference 
should satisfy the test of: 
 
a. Prescribed by law; 
b. has a legitimate aim; 
c. is necessary in a democratic society; 
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As in case of Article 5, ECtHR grants Margin of Appreciation to the states in regulation the legal grounds for 
involuntary treatment of persons with psychosocial impairments. For example the legislation envisaging the 
coercive treatment of persons with social impairment  on the ground of necessary for achieving the legitimate 
aim such as  protection of the “patient and/or others”134 the Court considered involuntary treatment justifiable.  
 
Oviedo Convention is the only international legally binding instrument on the protection of human rights in 
the biomedical field135 on regional level. It builds its standards on the principles already established by the 
ECHR, aiming at protection dignity and identity of human beings, guaranteeing the respect for the integrity 
without discrimination in the field of biology and medicine.136  
The Convention Explicitly allows the non-consensual treatment on the ground of “mental disability”137. When 
defining the consent, it refers to the domestic legislations and states that: “it is for domestic law in each 
country to determine, in its own way, whether or not persons are capable of consenting to an intervention 
and taking account of the need to deprive persons of their capacity for autonomy only where it is necessary 
in their best interests.”138 In such cases, as an exception from the general rule on consent, the medical 
intervention can be carried out with the consent of the persons “representative or an authority or a person or 
body provided for by law.”139 According to article 7 non-consensual, involuntary treatment, can be 
undertaken only when certain conditions are satisfied, such as: 
a. person must be suffering from “mental disorder”; 
b. Intervention should be necessary;  
c. Without treatment persons “mental disorder, serious harm is likely to result to the person’s health; 
d. The respective procedures enshrined in domestic legislation should be observed.140 
One more possibility for subjecting persons to a measure of confinement or involuntary treatment without 
consent is defined by Article 26, which states that it is possible when person represents a “possible source of 
serious harm to others.141” 
The approaches between ECHR and the Oviedo are identical. It is clear that the Oviedo convention took the 
approach ECtHR and integrated it in its text. The close interrelation of Oviedo Convention with the ECHR is 
also illustrated in the Article 29 which sets rules for interpretation. The article recognises the possibility of the 
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committee (DB-to seek an advisory opinion from the court for the “legal questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Convention.”142 
CRPD, after its adoption was integrated into CoE human rights system.143 The Council of Europe Strategy on 
Disability 2017-2023 explicitly refers to CRPD. It states that “the interpretation of the priority areas (of the 
Strategy) will be done in line with the CRPD, the evolving body of decisions, guidelines and General 
Comments of the CRPD Committee.”144 
In 2012, Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe issued a study145 which analysed the new 
standard of CRPD on legal capacity of persons with psychosocial disability. He recommended states to ratify 
the CRPD and its Optional Protocol and review domestic legislation on legal capacity for further 
harmonisation with the CRPD standard making the emphasis on identification and remedying “flaws and 
gaps depriving persons with disabilities of their human rights in relation to legislation concerning, inter alia, 
guardianship (…) compulsory psychiatric care and treatment.”146  He also highlighted the importance of 
ending “the practice of “voluntary” placements of persons in closed wards and social care homes against 
their will with consent of guardians or legal representatives”, as such placement was a deprivation of 
liberty.”147  
ECtHR has also cited the CRPD in its case-law.148 Though, the standard on legal capacity with regards to 
free and informed consent and involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment as it was already 
illustrated differs from the standard enshrined in CRPD. Nevertheless, already existing fragmentation and the 
clash between CRPD and CoE became even more problematic after 2013, when the Committee on Bioethics 
of the Council of Europe (DH-BIO) started the process of drafting of Draft Additional Protocol to the Oviedo 
Convention.149 Its explicit aim is the protection of human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder 
with regard to involuntary placement and involuntary treatment.150 The preamble of the draft document 
highlights that: “Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity 
between its members and that one of the methods by which this aim is pursued is the maintenance and 
further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms”151 and it is based on the ECHR articles 5 and 
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8. Although the preamble explicitly is highlighting that it builds upon CRPD, it contradicts the latter document. 
In particular articles 10 and 11 of the draft protocol define the criteria for involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment, which are similar to those criteria given in the explanatory Report of Oviedo 
Convention.152  
The text of the Draft Protocol and its explanatory report reflects some developments in the field. For 
example, it recognises the importance of alternative measures, and highlights that in cases when the person 
is subject to involuntary measures “the attempts shall continue to be made to seek their consent to all 
aspects of their therapeutic programme. 153 However, the mere fact that it allows the possibility of non-
consensual treatment and placement puts its standard in contradiction to CRPD. 
As rightly mentioned by the rapporteur Magradze, the adoption of the draft protocol sounds “severe, 
especially considering that the rationale behind these instruments and the draft Additional Protocol is the 
protection of people with psychosocial impairments from human rights abuses. However, one should not 
forget that these instruments date back to the pre-CRPD and thus reflect the medical model of disability 
prevalent at the time of their adoption.”154   
As discussed in the first chapter, the fragmentation in human rights law is more related to the different 
interpretations of specific human rights by its adjudicative and monitoring bodies rather than to the existence 
of colliding substantive norms.155Though, if the Optional Protocol adopted, conflict between CRPD norms 
and the Optional Protocol is inevitable. Taking into account, that, out of forty-seven CoE member states, fort-
six are States Parties of the CRPD, adoption of the Protocol will have a negative effect on the obligations of 
states under the CRPD.  
The Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe (DH-BIO) published the draft text of the Protocol for 
open consultations, in June 2015. As a result, DH-BIO received more than forty responses.156 UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI), 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGO), the CRPD Committee expressed concerns due to non-
compliance of the Draft Protocol with CRPD standard and asked DH-BIO to withdraw the Protocol.157 
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Despite this, DH-BIO decided to continue work on the Draft Protocol. The process of opposition to the 
protocol is continuing as of today. In 2017, four representatives of UN Special Procedures, Vice-Chair of the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Chair of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of the Highest Attainable Standard of physical and Mental Health, sent a 
joint letter to Secretary General of CoE, and reaffirmed the concerns about the collision of universal and 
regional standards.158 
One of the most critical towards the document of course was Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD Committee). As a response to the decision to continue work on the Draft Protocol, in 
2018, the CRPD Committee published statement where once again highlighted existence of the “blunt 
conflict” between CRPD and the Protocol. It reaffirmed its position and “strongly” recommended to States 
Parties to the CRPD to “explicitly oppose” the adoption of the Protocol.159 
In the same year, The European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI)160 and Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), issued the statement addressing the states to oppose to the Draft Protocol.161 
It is noteworthy that the draft of the Protocol was criticized within CoE as well. Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe, referred to the decision on adoption of the Optional Protocol, as to the 
“wrong direction” for the Council of Europe and recommended the withdrawal of the Protocol.162 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE recommended the Committee of Ministers to 
instruct DH-BIO to withdraw the Draft Protocol, emphasising, that the Protocol would “undermine the Council 
of Europe’s credibility (…) it would also risk creating and explicit conflict between international norms.” 
The fact that text of the Protocol conflicts the standard enshrined in CRPD is not questionable. As 
recognised in opinions mentioned above, the adoption of the Protocol will result in fragmented “conflicting” 
framework towards the standard on Involuntary Placement and Non-consensual treatment of persons with 
psychosocial impairments.“163 Moreover, Taking into account that the standard introduced by CRPD is 
relatively new,  adoption of the Draft Protocol will “hinder the efforts of Member States”164 to harmonise 
domestic legislations and “prolong the status quo.”165  While international human rights is regulated by 
international and regional human rights instruments and supervised by relevant treaty bodies, the principle of 
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subsidiarity considers that the States are the primary guarantors of human rights.166 As stated by Jack 
Donnelly, “the struggle for human rights will be won or lost at the national level.”167  
The question is whether the Draft Protocol can be considered to be the only factor which leads to the 
fragmentation between the CRPD and the CoE standards on involuntary placement and non-consensual 
treatment. This thesis tends to believe that even if the Draft Protocol is withdrawn, the tension between two 
human rights regimes will not cease to exist.  
As illustrated above, the Oviedo Convention and hence the Draft Protocol are mainly reflecting the standards 
enshrined in the case-law of ECtHR. Moreover, the fact that the Draft Protocol reaffirms the position of 
ECtHR on involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment is illustrated in the response168 of CoE 
Director General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, to a letter of UN Special Rapporteurs. The letter 
explicitly refers to the standard of ECHR according to which involuntary measures are justified only in 
exceptional situations. As highlighted further, the Draft Protocol can be “an effective tool to ensure that in all 
circumstances, involuntary measures are embedded with the guarantees required”169 by ECHR.  
The influence of ECtHR case law on formation of domestic standards of States parties is immense. It is the 
strong, widely recognised judicial body with mandatory enforcement mechanism.170 On the contrary, UN 
treaty bodies are quasi-judicial bodies offering concluding observation of advisory character to the member 
states under the State reporting mechanism.171 CRPD has Optional Protocol172 which establishes individual 
complaint mechanism. Out of forty six CoE member states, which are simultaneously States parties of 
CRPD, only seven states have not ratified the Optional Protocol. Although it is promising that Optional 
Protocol has been widely ratified by CoE States, the case-law of the CRPD Committee is not yet developed, 
thus it cannot compete with the ECtHR. 
Thus, the thesis argues that even if the Draft Protocol is withdrawn, without changing the approach of 
ECtHR, the risk of fragmentation among States practices will remain. Reluctance of States to comply with the 
CRPD standard will have vast negative effect on the realisation and enjoyment of rights of persons with 
psychosocial impairments. As rightly pointed out by Brams, at the end of the day it is the individuals (right 
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holders) and the States which are affected by the existence of conflicting norms.173 The next chapter will 
discuss the possibilities of overcoming the problem of fragmentation between the CoE and CRPD standards 
on involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment though enhancement of domestic legislation.  
 
 
Chapter 3. Harmonisation of domestic legislations as a solution.  
Even though several International organisations requested the withdrawal of the draft protocol, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the work and consultations on the document are ongoing. Even if withdrawal of the 
Protocol is achieved the existed fragmentation between the CRPD and ECHR and its case-law will not be 
resolved. Thus, this thesis argues that the most effective way to overcome the conflict is the harmonisation of 
the national legislations with CRPD standard. Accordingly, main efford of the international human rights 
community and national actors should be focused on this process. CoE member states, especially those who 
already initiated the reforms for harmonisation of domestic legislation with CRPD standard, can also play the 
positive role in this process.  
Harmonisation of the legislation on one hand will eradicate the risk of further fragmentation of standard on 
involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment for the certain States. At the same time if 
harmonisation of the standard on national levels is achieved on big scale, it will commence the process 
which is known as “European consensus.” The practice has shown, the existence of such consensus has led 
to the modification of the lower human rights standard to higher and strict one. This thesis recognises that 
harmonisation of domestic legislation cannot be considered as the only solution to the fragmentation. 
Though argues that with the mechanisms enshrined in the CRPD it is possible it can be successfully 
realized.  
a. Importance of domestic legislation in Oviedo Convention and the Draft Additional Protocol 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, and highlighted by Lawrence and Gable, the main feature of 
international human rights, before adoption of CRPD was "leaving domestic governments with a wide range 
of discretion in relation to those rights and freedoms.174 This approach can be read in the texts of Oviedo 
Convention and the Draft Protocol. It is not surprising in case of Oviedo, as it was adopted long before the 
adoption of CRPD.  Draft Protocol, although in the preamble175 recognises importance and takes into 
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account “the work carried out at international level on the protection of dignity and rights of persons with 
“mental disorders,” in particular the CRPD, still conflicts with its standards. 
The Oviedo Convention is the core document which gives the series of main principles, which are clarified, 
strengthened and supplemented by additional protocols regulating specific issues.176 Accordingly, the rules 
enshrined in the Draft Protocol should be read and implemented according to the main concepts of Oviedo 
Convention. 
Both Oviedo and the Draft Additional Protocol are stating that involuntary placement and non-consensual 
treatment, should be used according to domestic legislation.177 As clarified in the Explanatory Report, 178 this 
is reflection of the standard given in ECHR (articles 5 and 8) and the case-law of the ECtHR, which requires 
that the measures should be "prescribed by law," and by it, both mean the domestic regulations.  
Another principle which is also taking in account the domestic law, is the regulation concerning the consent 
of the person on medical treatment and limitations of their legal capacity. 
In particular articles 10 and 11, state that involuntary placement and treatment can be used when the 
following criteria are met: 
i. a. The person's mental health condition represents a significant risk of serious harm to his or her health, and 
his or her ability to decide on placement is severely impaired, or 
b. The person’s mental health condition represents a significant risk of serious harm to others; 
ii. The placement has a therapeutic purpose; and 
iii. Any voluntary measure is insufficient to address the risk(s) referred to in paragraph  
The Draft Protocol, when referring to the "person's ability to decide on placement," according to its 
explanatory report, "follows the approach" of the Oviedo Convention regarding consent.179 As already 
illustrated in previous chapter, Oviedo recognises the non-consensual coercive interventions when person 
has "mental disorder", the intervention is necessary and when without treatment, serious harm "is likely to 
result to a person's health," and the protective conditions enshrined in the domestic legislation are followed. 
Moreover, the explanatory report highlights that due to the diversity of legal systems in Europe dealing with 
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the "incapacitation" of the persons, the Oviedo Convention relies on the domestic law of the state to 
determine "whether or not persons are capable of consenting to an intervention."180 Accordingly, in the words 
of ECtHR “margin of appreciation”181 is granted to the states when regulating the “incapacitation” of persons 
with psychological impairment.  
 Another article referring to domestic legislation is of particular interest for this thesis. In particular, the 
revised text of the draft Additional Protocol, in Article 1.2 states that the provisions of Protocol “do not limit or 
otherwise affect the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure of protection than is stipulated in this 
protocol;”182 The explanatory report of the Draft Protocol specifies that the main aim of the paragraph is to 
give states the right to provide wider protection than provided by the protocol.183 Although the report does not 
refer to the CRPD standard explicitly, the existing criticism around the text of the draft gives the reason to 
believe that the article was included in the protocol to mitigate the conflict between the standards and leave it 
up to state parties to decide which treaty to follow.   
The fact that the draft protocol leaves a possibility to follow the higher standard and links the regulation of the 
most crucial definitions (such as legal capacity and regulation of involuntary placement/treatment) up to the 
national legislations, means that member states of the Oviedo even if they adopt the protocol cannot justify 
their incompliance with the CRPD based on the existence of the protocol. Moreover, all 28 member states of 
the Oviedo, simultaneously are the state parties of the CRPD, accordingly, have the obligation to give effect 
and translate the Conventional standards on legal capacity, in good faith.184 If from an international 
perspective the CRPD and the Oviedo and its protocol are the treaties which are parts of the parallel 
systems, creating obligations for the member states simultaneously, after the ratification of both treaties, they 
become the part of one particular national legislature. Accordingly, when reading the obligations together, 
and taking into account article 1.2 of the draft protocol, it cannot be considered as an obstacle for the states 
for following the higher standard of CRPD and ensure the - absolute character of 1. legal capacity and 2. 
prohibition of involuntary placement.    
This argument of course should be examined from the Constitutional law perspective as well. It should be 
recognised that realisation on abovementioned theory depends on several factors which have impact on 
implementation of international human rights treaties in domestic law. As identified by the European 
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Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),185 the implementation of the international 
treaties mainly is influenced by the “conseptualisation of the relation between international and domestic 
law”186 which is more known as monism ad dualism; by hierarchy of human rights treaties within domestic 
legislation,187 and what is the effect of interpretation clauses in domestic constitutions. 188 The theory 
represented above will have more advantages in the monist systems, where international and domestic law 
are considered as “unified legal order.”189 In this systems international law does not need incorporation is 
domestic legal acts, it is directly applicable and can be adjudicated by courts.190 While in dualist systems, 
which believes that domestic law and international law are two separate systems191 the harmonisation will 
depend on additional factors such as will of state, resources, level of democracy and whether the rights of 
persons with disabilities is on the agenda of the state.  
As stated by De Wet, at the end of the day all states have the “legal tools with which to give effect to 
international obligations.”192 How to ensure the implementation of CRPD standards on domestic levels will 
presented in the last chapter of this thesis. Meanwhile it is obvious that today, the Draft Protocol and Oviedo 
are in the middle of the gap between the national standards and the standards enshrined in CRPD. Thus, 
from a practical point of view, as soon as the CRPD requirements will be fulfilled by the state and more 
restrictive regulations will be placed on national levels, the need of the draft protocol will be eradicated 
automatically. 
 
c. Creation of European consensus as a tool for changing the ECtHR case law. 
To understand how the approach of the CoE can be changed through ECtHR case-law several aspects 
should be taken into account. First, the ECHR is the most influential human rights treaty on the regional 
level. Second, the ECHR looks at the member states as representatives of the “common heritage of political 
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.”193 According to established ECtHR case-law, the ECHR is a 
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living instrument,194 and thus uses the “evolutive interpretation” of the convention195 for ensuring that the 
“meaning of the rights (enshrined in the Convention are) both contemporary and effective”.196  
 
As Rachovista highlights, “The idea of European consensus is seminal to the Court’s reasoning.”197 The 
doctrine of European Consensus was first used by the Grand Chamber in Demir and Baykara case198, when 
the ECtHR stated that “taking into account interpretation of PIL norms is based on the existence of a 
European consensus, namely the common international and/or domestic law standard accepted by the vast 
majority of states199.” The concept always works together with the doctrine of margin of appreciation and 
dynamic/evolutive interpretation.200  In defining whether the wide or narrow margin should be granted to 
states, the court looks at various factors, such as ‘’sensitivity of the issue, the right involved, public interest 
and the existence of the European consensus on the matter.” When European Consensus is achieved, The 
Court is restricting the Margin of Appreciation of the States.201 
 
The European consensus was the reason for the ECtHR to modify its practice towards the legal recognition 
of the sex change. In the case of Christine Goodwin,202 a transsexual woman, was claiming the alleged 
violation of the Article 8 (the right to private and family life) due to fact that it was impossible to recognise her 
sex change. The Court, while in other identical cases was reluctant to find the violation203,used the “emerging 
consensus” in European states to change its standard and stated that “the respondent Government can no 
longer claim that the matter falls within their margin of appreciation”.204 
 
Another example when the Court used the “emerging European consensus’ for condemning the margin of 
appreciation is the standard on the “prohibition of physical punishment in schools”.205 
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In particular, in the case Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that: “The Convention is a living 
instrument which (…) must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. The Court cannot but be 
influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in (…) the Member States of the Council 
of Europe[1].206” 
 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, in defining the legal capacity and its restriction, the Court 
leaves the margin of appreciation to the states. It at the involuntary placement [SQ2]and non-consensual 
from the formal procedural perspective such as: whether the domestic legislations, and proportionality and 
necessity are met.  
 
The possibility of creating a European Consensus amongst CoE states on the prohibition of involuntary 
placement and non-consensual treatment is possible due to several reasons. First, as it was already 
mentioned, out of 48 CoE member states, 47 have ratified the CRPD and, accordingly, all of them accepted 
an obligation to comply with the standards of absolute legal capacity and prohibition of involuntary placement 
and treatment. With extensive advocacy of NHRIs and civil society, most importantly DPO’s, the 
harmonisation of domestic legislations is achievable. 
 
If such standard is achieved in the majority of member states legislation, previously illustrated examples lead 
to the conclusion that there is a high possibility that ECtHR will change its attitude towards the standard and 
will alleviate it.  
 
Another positive sign is the extensive use of CRPD in the case-law of. In general, the ECtHR is very open to 
external international human rights norms. As some authors state, the court systematically applies external 
norms “in light of their progressive development by their monitoring bodies,”207 to avoid and lessen the 
possibility of conflicting interpretations.208 It gives the possibility to the Court to detect and integrate evolving 
standards on the regional and international level.209 
 
Although case law and the approach of the Court is not fully in compliance with the standards of CRPD in 
relation to other relevant standards, such as “equality matters”, the Court actively refers to the 
aforementioned UN Convention and uses it for the interpretation of ECHR.210   
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For example, in the case S.H.H. V United Kingdom, (para 94) “ECtHR affirmed that ‘the Convention does not 
apply in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law’, so that 
in the present case ‘the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has to be read 
as informing the scope to be given to Article 3[3]’211”. In the case Glor v. Switzerland, where the applicant 
claimed to be a victim of discrimination on the ground of disability, the Court explicitly referred to the CRPD 
and stated  that there was a European consensus regarding the “need to protect people with disabilities from 
discriminatory treatment.”212  
Stanev v. Bulgaria213 is another judgment of the Grand Chamber which is of particular interest for this 
subchapter. In this case, the Court presented the argument about the involuntary placement of a person with 
psychological impairment in a mental health institution. Although the Court maintained its position on 
restrictions of the persons capacity when necessary due to the person's life and health, it found a violation of 
Article 5 of the convention on the bases of inexistence of “immediate risk, or require the imposition of any 
special restrictions to protect his life and limb214.  Unfortunately, here as well the Court never discussed the 
absolute nature of the Article 12 of the CRPD and found a violation on another ground. This judgement is 
important from another perspective. When assessing the merits of the case, the Court referred to the 
inexistence of a “uniform approach in Europe to the question of placement of legally incapacitated persons in 
specialized institutions.” This leads to the conclusion that if such consensus will emerge, the Court will take it 
into account.   
“The margin of appreciation is a reflection of the principle of subsidiarity. Inconsistent application of the 
doctrine together with the principle of European consensus can be used “to ensure the consent of the States, 
convince the general public, and secure obedience”.215 “When the Court sees the European Consent margin 
of appreciation narrows and together with the doctrine of consensus, it creates the new human rights 
safeguard which should be applied on the domestic level.” 216  
The raising number of concurring opinions of the judges in ECtHR case law also points to the growing 
importance of the CRPD standard. In case Kuttner v Austria217 the claimant was the person with 
psychosocial impairment, convicted according to criminal law. The Court found a violation of Art 5.4 of the 
ECtHR due to the fact that a period of 16 months between the proceedings concerning the applicant’s 
request to be released from the institution did not fulfil the requirement of a speed review and that the delay 
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in examining his request was attributable to the courts.” [SQ4]In his partly concurring and partly dissenting 
opinion, Judge Pinto De Albuquerque referred to the fact that the while adjudicating the Court did not take 
into account Article 14 of the CRPD, which states that “detention based on the perceived danger of mentally 
ill persons to themselves or to others breaches Article 14[SQ5]. Which rejected the approach enshrined in 
the 1991 MI principles. He drew attention to the fact that when persons with disabilities, including persons 
with psychosocial impairments, are arrested, detained or imprisoned, Article 14.2 of CRPD “guarantees non-
discrimination, including by the provision of reasonable accommodation on an individualised basis. In other 
words, “the appropriate modification and adjustment to secure to each person with disabilities the enjoyment 
or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms[SQ6]. Moreover, as 
he highlighted, “in criminal cases automatic and involuntary transfer to mental health facilities within or 
outside an ordinary prison facility, or the imposition of mental health treatment as a condition of probation, 
parole or a transfer to a softer or “normal” prison regime, cannot be consider a reasonable individualised 
accommodation for persons with disability. Thus, States parties should ensure that each detained person 
with disabilities has access to voluntary, timely health care[7][SQ8].  Based on these arguments, the Judge 
concluded that the Austrian Criminal Code, representing vague and disproportionate form of involuntary 
transfer of criminally responsible persons to mental health facilities, within or outside of an ordinary prison 
was discriminatory based on mental disability in the context of criminal sanctions and violates Article 14 of 
CRPD[9].”  
 
Taking into consideration all above mentioned, the thesis tends to believe that, with the growing number of 
domestic legislations which are in accordance with CRPD standard and the importance of CRPD already 
recognised by the court in its case law, the evolution of the standard concerning the legal capacity and 
prohibition of involuntary placement is possible. Moreover, some authors stated that “ECtHR disability case 
law will produce a “spillover effect”218 and the Court while following the standards enshrined in the CRPD will 
adopt its interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR in compliance with Article 12 of the CRPD.219 
 
One might argue that the presented discussion and arguments are purely theoretical and it will be very 
difficult to translate them into practice. But the position of CoE member states such as Bulgaria, Portugal and 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia can be considered as a positive sign in this direction.  
Achieving the higher human rights standard through the States practices can be doubted. But following 
chapters will illustrate the possibilities and concrete mechanisms which can be 
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The next chapter aims to illustrate the practical ways of achieving harmonisation of the domestic legislation 
with the CRPD. For this, article 33 of the aforementioned UN Convention is of crucial importance. It 
represents a unique mechanism, aiming at effective implementation – monitoring, promotion and protection – 
of CRPD on domestic levels.   
 
Chapter 4. The role of Article 33, practical tool in achieving coherence  
As suggested in the previous chapter, harmonisation of domestic legislations with CRPD standard will have 
two effects. First, it will eradicate the necessity of the Draft Protocol and overcome the conflict between it and 
CRPD. Second, the growing number of States with harmonised legislation will open up a wide perspective. It 
will jumpstart the process of creation of “European Consensus” on the subject matter, which will lead to 
(gamkacreba) at ECtHR level.  
Although as demonstrated, in many states the legislation is not in compliance with the CRPD standard on 
legal capacity and prohibition of non-consensual placement and treatment, the thesis suggests that Article 
33 could be used as a practical tool, that would immensely contribute in shifting the states’ position in favour 
of harmonisation. 
As noted by Raley, during the drafting process of the CRPD, human rights community was aware of the fact 
that human rights treaties were facing the problem of implementation and were “failing to have the necessary 
impact on the politics and practices of the state parties.”220 Root of the problem was ineffectiveness of UN 
human rights monitoring mechanisms.221  Thus, to ensure utmost implementation of CRPD in domestic 
legislations,222 CRPD  shifted its approach from “two dimensional”223 perspective of monitoring, which 
focuses on the relationship between States and treaty bodies to “pluri-dimensional,”224 by introducing 
“unprecedented and innovative”225 article 33.  
The Article 33 is a practical tool, focusing on the “implementation gap” between the standards enshrined in 
CRPD and its implementation and impact on persons with disabilities.226 It introduces the obligation of the 
States in three directions. First, requests from governments to “designate a focal point within the 
government,”227 second, requires to “maintain, strengthen, designate or establish” the independent 
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mechanism for promotion, protection and monitoring of implementation of the convention;228 and third, places 
responsibility on States to guarantee involvement and full participation of civil society in the monitoring 
process.229  
Focal points should be designated within the government, and should coordinate the implementation of the 
convention by the national disability agenda as well as awareness raising of Ministries on the obligations 
enshrined in the CRPD.230 This is the mechanism which is the guarantor that the activities and 
recommendations of the independent mechanisms and  Civil society will be reflected in the process of 
domestic implementation of the CRPD.231 While the importance of focal points cannot be underestimated, 
this chapter will focus on the activities of independent mechanisms and civil society which can play a crucial 
role in the harmonisation process of domestic legislations with Article 12 and 14 of CRPD.  
 
a. The role of independent mechanisms 
As already mentioned, article 33(2) of the CRPD requires the member states to put a framework “that will 
include one or more independent mechanisms.”232 The main aim of the mechanisms should be the 
protection, promotion and monitoring the implementation of the CRPD. It should be highlighted that although 
the article does not necessarily requires the states to designate the National Human Rights Institutions 
(hereafter NHRI), the article makes highlights that when making the decision, States parties should adhere to 
the principles relation to the status and functioning of national institutions for the protection and promotion of 
human rights (Paris Principles).233 As clarified later, although the states can designate more than one 
independent mechanisms, at least one of them should function according to the Paris Principles.234 The 
crucial role of  NHRI s role in improvement execution of human rights treaties have been highly recognised 
by the international community. 235 
 
In practice a lot of States nominated the NHRI as independent bodies.  In Poland Public Defender was 
designated. In Georgia the Public Defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, For example in Denmark ,Danish 
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Institute for Human Rights, Danish Disability Council and Parliamentary Ombudsman Is designated as an 
independent mechanism,236  
 
According to Accreditation on status as of 8 August 2018, It should be noted that out of 47 CRPD/ CoE 
member states only two States, Romania and Switzerland have C status, thus considered to be non-
compliant with the Paris Principles , ten are holders of B status and twenty five States have the A status. 
Other States such as Andora, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Italy, Malta Monaco San Marino and 
Turkey, do not have the National Human Rights Institutions.237  
Reports and recommendations 
One of the responsibilities of NHRI enshrined in the Paris Principles is to “promote and ensure the 
harmonisation of national legislation with (…) international human rights instruments to which the State is a 
party.”238 In practice this responsibility can be fulfilled with different techniques. One of them is addressing 
relevant branches of the State make proposals and recommendations on harmonisation of national 
legislation with the requirements enshrined in the Articles 12 and 14 of the CRPD and accordingly for 
adoption new or amending existing laws. 239  Often such recommendations are the part of the Special 
thematic reports or Annual Reports on Human rights situation presented by the NHRI.240  For example, 
Public Defender of Georgia which was designated as an independent mechanism under article 33(2) has 
issued the special study report.241 The report assessed the legal reform aiming at harmonisation of national 
legislation with regards to legal capacity of persons with psychosocial disability with Article 12 of CRPD. 
According to the findings, Georgian legislation  “except for a few exceptions” is in line with the CRPD 
standard.242 However, the implementation of new legislation was identified problematic thus the report 
formulates concrete recommendations for addressing the problem. Another example is the report of the 
Danish Institute of Human Rights, which together with the Danish Disability Council and the Danish 
Parliamentary Ombudsman is designated as independent mechanism under Article 33 (2). In its report, 
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organisation recommended the reform of the Guardianship Act and promote assisted decision-making for 
achieving the harmonisations with CRPD.243  
 
Facilitating implementation of Concluding Observations 
Another responsibility identified by Paris Principles, which can warrant the effectiveness of NHRI in process 
of harmonisation of national legislation with CRPD is the requirement to “contribute to the reports which 
States are required to submit” to treaty bodies and express their opinion.244 In practice, as highlighted by 
Beco, NHRI’s except for their involvement in the State reporting procedures can also facilitate the 
implementation of the Concluding Observations. 245 As of September 2019, out of 47 CoE member states, 
which are also the States Parties of the CRPD, Committee of CRPD issued Concluding Observations on 
thirty-one state reports. None of them is in full compliance with the CRPD standard on legal capacity and 
prohibition of involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment. Only in the case of Hungary, has the 
Committee appreciated the efforts and commitments of the state to harmonise its legislation according to Art 
12 and 14, and in the case of Austria it “welcomed the launch of the model pilot project on supported 
decision-making, Under the National Disability Action Plan.” But expressed its concerns about 
implementation of art14. It should be also highlighted that in the States Reports of Albania and Andorra were 
expressed the commitment to harmonise domestic legislations according to CRPD standard with regards to 
legal capacity and prohibition of involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment. Taking this into 
consideration, the facilitation and the follow -up of the Committees recommendations by the independent 
bodies is of most importance. When Concluding Observations require the legislative reforms and changes, 
as illustrated this is the case, one of the techniques identified in countries which have the National Human 
Rights Action plan ensure that the Concluding Observations are incorporated in the Action Plan and regularly 
interact with the national legislature on implementation of COs. 246 
 
Applications to the Constitutional Courts 
As stated by the Venice Commission, the role of the Constitutional Courts in revision of compliance of 
domestic legislation with international human rights treaties is immense.247  Of course, when considering this 
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function as a practical tool for harmonisation, the hierarchy of human rights treaties within the domestic legal 
system should be taken into account. But as it was already mentioned in the previous chapter, in majority of 
CoE member States the constitutional courts are undertaking the “review of conventionality.”248Moreover, in 
some cases the Constitutions directly state that in case of the conflict between the human rights the state is 
a party to and the national law the former shall prevail and the Constitutional Courts have the power to “annul 
any piece of legislation (…) which conflicts with an international agreement.249 The examples can be found in 
the Constitutions of Romania and Hungary.250  
Although Paris Principles is not referring to the function of NHRI to apply to Constitutional Courts, in practice 
this is considered as “desirable” function of the NHRI.251 As European Commission for Democracy Through 
Law Venice Commission recommended in its study,252 NHRIs should have the possibility to apply to the 
constitutional courts concerning constitutionality of laws when they negatively affect human rights and 
freedoms. Practice has shown that many NHRIs have the right to “launch actions in constitutional and other 
courts.”253.  
For example, In Hungary and Georgia NHRIs - Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and the Public 
Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, which are also designated as an independent body under article 33(2), 
can bring the applications before the Constitutional Court, when domestic law is not in compliance with the 
States international obligations, including CRPD.254 The NHRI of Spain (Ombudsman) can submit the cases 
before the Constitutional Court even for an abstract review.255  
Thus, this power of NHRIs can be considered as one of the ways to achieve harmonisation of domestic 
legislation with the standard of CRPD on involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment. Although 
CRPD is relatively new treaty, the examples attempts to achieve higher standard on domestic level through 
Constitutional Courts already can be observed. For example, in Poland NHRI used this power and presented 
the claim before the Constitutional Court of Poland “to challenge a provision in mental health legislation that 
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stated that only minors aged sixteen and older needed to consent to psychiatric treatment when civil law 
conferred limited legal capacity on children starting at the age of thirteen.” 
 
Fighting taboo 
 
As already mentioned, independent mechanism except for protection and monitoring should also promote 
the implementation of the CRPD. According to the Paris Principles the NHRI should assist educational 
institutions in teaching of human rights, also they should take appropriate steps to combut discrimination 
through educational and awareness raising activities. 
As Bartlett rightly points, the paradigm shift introduced by CRPD requires “ideological shift” and cannot be 
achieved through administrative activities.256  Moreover, the process “is primarily a political, rather than a 
legal one.” This is particularly relevant in case of legal capacity and prohibition of Involuntary placement and 
non-consensual treatment.  
As highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, the causes of “disability - 
specific forms of deprivation of liberty” are social. Cultural, religious and social stigma leads to extreme 
isolation and “social rejection.” moreover as identified by the Rapporteur, one of the main prejudices towards 
persons with disabilities and persons with psychosocial disabilities are associated with violance and 
dangerous, which leads to “coercive practicies.” not only society but “mental health professionals as well. 
Thus Rapporteur explicitly referred to the need of capacity-building and awareness raising activities. As 
stated in report “the Changes to legal and policy frameworks will not be sufficient, unless accompanied by a 
major shift in the societal perception of persons with disabilities” for “shigring the public narattive about 
violence and persons with psychosocial disabilities”  
 
One of the reasons for resistance towards harmonisation of this particular principle can be seen in existing 
stereotypes and perceptions on psychological disability.  Mumerious studies, reports and researches all 
recognise the existing misperseptions about psycho-social disability, the need of persons to be protected 
and the risks identified to them. Educational function of the NHRIs can play additional role in the process of 
harmonisation. The Paris Principles also explicitly highlight the importance of such programmes and requires 
from NHRIs to assist universities and othere ducation institutions and undertake activities to combut 
discrimination through education and awareness-raising. As arhued by Andrea Brodrick the transformation 
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approach is necessary for achiebing the equality. and it should “adress the socially constructed barriers, 
stereotypes, negative customs and practices which hinder the full enjoyment of rights by margilized groups,” 
The importance of combuting the stereotypes and stigma for successful implementation of the CRPD is 
enshired in its article 8 which requires from states to “combat stereotyoes, prejudices and harmful practices 
relating to persons with disabilities.” 
The activities of NHRIs can be various in this direction, from trainig meetings and educational 
systems257“promotional activities, such as collecting, producing and disseminating information and materials, 
organising public events and encouraging community initiatives”258. All. These activities can be very useful in 
awareness raising on psychosocial and intellectual impairments and the consequences of the Involuntary 
treatment and the Non-consensual placement for persons. This activities can have an influence on “change 
of behaviour and will foster and acceptance of the values underlying which is necessary for its 
internalisation”259 the paradigm shift in legal capacity.  
As an advantage to the harmonisation should be also considered the existence of international Networks 
where the NHRI’s and Independent bodies have a contact point. for example the Coordinating Committee of 
NHRIs, which unites amongst representatives from other regional groups united NHRI’s from thirty-seven 
CoE member states.260 Another network worth mentioning is the European Network of National Human 
Rights Institutions. The network established a special working group on UNCRPD (WG). The WG “brings 
together” NHRI’s which are designated as independent mechanisms under article 33(2) aiming at “provide a 
point of contact” and identify, develop and promotion of good practices for effective implementation of CRPD 
in member states. One of the aims identified by WG to undertake joint efforts to influence the implementation 
process and “development of jurisprudence” in States.  
the position of the WG towards the involuntary placement and non-consensual treatment is in line with CRPD 
standard. It was reaffirmed in the Comments of the WG on the Draft Protocol, where the NHRIs expressed 
their concerns that the Draft Protocol was not inline with CRPD “implicitly or explicitly”Moreover they 
highlighted the problem of creation of the treaty which “does not accord with the obligations of the State 
Parties under the CRPD”  
Check their connection with the Council of Europe and argue that they can influence the process there as 
well.  – the importance and the role of NHRI’s is highly recognised by the Council of Europe – At the Council 
of Europe level “ adopted recommendation No.R (97) 14 on the Establishment of Independent National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Resolution (97) 11 on Cooperation 
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Between National Human Rights Institutions of Member States and Between Them and The Council of 
Europe”261 (sanakhavia) 
 
   b. The role of civil society 
 
 “The ratification of the treaty is not guaranteeing compliance with these rights, but it does offer new 
resources to those groups that can benefit from its implementation. It increases the chances of successful 
social mobilisation by providing citizens with additional arguments for their claims towards government. “262 
“it increases the range of strategies a social movement can use to secure policy change. It also provides a 
political opening for rights demanders in politics, it creates a room for strategies of “rightful resistance” or the 
ability of individuals and nascent social movements to use officially sanctioned levers in pressing their rights 
claims.263 
Beth Simmons discusses the three mechanisms through which “treaties might have effects in domestic 
politics – altering the national agenda, leveraging litigation, and empowering political mobilization264  ( 
caikitkhe da mere daamate) and article 33 of the Convention opens all these possibilities even more. It 
should be also mentioned that all these three possibilities can be easily tackled by the NHRI’s and CS and 
DPO representatives. “it gives those actors concerned with the promotion and protection of disability rights 
the unique opportunity to urge States to abide by their commitments through their participation in various 
bodies, thereby making the Convention a powerful tool for their action”265 
Article 33 (3) demands that civil society should be fully involved in the monitoring process of CRPD 
implementation. As it was already mentioned in the previous chapter, persons with disabilities, and civil 
society representatives were actively involved in the drafting process of CRPD through the DPO’s with the 
slogan “Nothing about us without us.”266 As highlighted by Dagener, more than 400 NGOs had been 
accredited to the Ad Hoc Committee, in the process of drafting of the treaty. This process resulted in 
recognition of the role of PwD’s and DPOs in the monitoring process of the CRPD.267 As recognised by the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (heirafter The Committee), the participation had a 
“positive impact on the quality” of CRPD. This at the same time showed the “force, influence and potential” of 
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PwD’s. Another article which also insures the full participation of PwDs through DPO’s in public life is Article 
4(3) of the CRPD. According to the General Comment No 5, the Committee under the “representative 
organisations” clarified and referred to the following PDO’s: The umbrella organisations, cross-disability 
organisations, self - advocacy organisations, organisations representing and established by family members 
or relatives of PwD’s, organisations representing exclusively women and girls and organisation focusing on 
children and young persons rights with disabilities. the Committee also clarified its position regarding the 
involvement of NGOs and Civil society representatives in monitoring process. It highlighted that, although 
according to Article 33(3) in monitoring process all civil society organisations should have possibility to be 
involved, the states should give the priority to DPO’s as to the representative and voice of PwD’s. At the 
same time as indicated by the Committee, States Parties should have the continuous consultations with 
DPOs while introducing the legislation or designing the special project regarding the rights of PwDs. This 
should be achieved through the establishment of “permanent consultation mechanisms.”  
As indicated in the latest report of FRA Europe, although the participation of DPO’s in monitoring process 
wishes for better, the gradual progress can be observed in EU countries on the involvement of persons with 
disabilities in decision making processes. there are several illustrations how the participation of DPO’s led to 
the improvement of the process of implementation of the CRPD and had a result. For example in Denmark 
the DPO and other CS organisations together with the NHRIs of Denmark are advocating for creation of 
national Disability Action plan. In Finland, with active participation of DPO’s the Advisory Board for the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities which is designated as a focal point under article 33(1), prepared the “National 
Action Plan on the CRPD for 2018-2019.”In Poland after extensive protests and advocacy for creation the 
support programs for persons with disabilities, the government drafted the program on support system for 
persons with disabilities and is in the process of consultations with DPOs. 
Although none of the presented examples have an effect of equal recognition of legal capacity and 
prohibition of non-consensual placement and involuntary treatment, the fact that the states of CoE are 
becoming more open to the participation of DPO’s in the monitoring gives hope that the same can be 
achieved on this rights as well. 
Moreover the participation of PDO’s in the process of CRPD monitoring was enhanced through the 
Independent monitoring mechanisms. For example, in Georgia the Public Defender, which is designated as 
independent mechanism under article 33(2) established Consultative Council. Out of fifteen members of the 
Council, nine are representatives of DPO’s. The DPO’s are actively involved in the process of designing the 
action plan of the independent mechanism. mechanisms like this opens the possibility of coordination 
between the two main actors designated for monitoring the implementation of the CRPD. It is a forum for 
discussions on existing problems and consultations on  future strategies for ensuring the state compliance 
with international treaty obligations. As stated by Dagener, irt increases the “impact of their demands by 
channeling them through the NHRI.”268 
Growing evidence as to the effectiveness of non-coercive support practices outside the health sector ( 
please see A/HRC/35?21, para 29) “Those practices need to be further researched, developed and 
implemented, and must be based on the principles set out above regarding supported decision-making.” the 
role of DPO’s can be crucial in this direction. together with participation possibility by focusing on the existing 
good practices and the examples they can facilitate evidence-based decisions from the States, in particular 
concerning the legal capacity and non-consensual placement and treatment.  
Moreover the recent practice has shown that the DPO’s are actively involved in enhancing the process of 
harmonisation of national legislations with the Article 12 by representing relevant supporting decision making 
models. 
In 2017, one of the biggest Europena non-governmental network organisations, “Mental Health Europe “ 
issued the position paper on article 12 of the CRPD to provide guidance to EU states how the persons with 
psychosocial disabilities can be supported to make the decisions.  in Andalusia, the Human RIghts and 
Mental Health Group developed the guide on “advanced care Planning in Mental Health” which aims to 
providing the guidelines the mental health care users and professionals in line with CRPD. Paper illustrates 
several successful projects initiated by the Civil Society. Among which it refers to andalusian practice of 
“Advance Care Planning” model which enables persons to officially express their will and preferences in 
advance, which should be included in the official medical record and will be used by healthcare professionals 
in case of person faces “inability to make decisions,” or express their preferences and will on treatment. The 
model was elaborated after adoption of the law on Patient Anatomy and aims harmonisation of national 
legislation and practice with the article 12 of CRPD. In case of successful implementation of this initiative the 
absolute legal capacity can be achieved which will have an effect on implementation of Article 14 as well.  
“Article 33 is not designed for countries who do not implement trea- ties because they are hostile to human 
rights. Rather, it is designed for states that may be accepting of human rights in theory, but have trouble fully 
imple- menting human rights treaties because the treaties are a low legislative priority, or it's unclear who is 
responsible for them, or they are simply forgotten amongst other state business. The Article 33 framework 
can address these problems. “269 
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Of course the described functions and possibilities of NHRIs cannot be considered exhaustive. The thesis 
attempted to identify the most relevant and effective ways for achieving the compliance of national 
legislations with CRPD standard on articles 12 and 14. These activities should be combined with the 
functions of NHRI such as individual complaint handling. Cooperation with the Committee of CRPD, the 
function of monitoring of closed psychiatric institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
On the role of best practices In particular with sharing best practices on alternatives to involuntary placement 
and non-consensual treatment, supportive decision-making models and identifying challenges faced during 
their implementation to tackle all identified problems with assistance of international community and expert 
groups in the timely manner. 
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